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MARTINEZ v. SOCOMA COMPANIES: PROBLEMS
IN DETERMINING CONTRACT
BENEFICIARIES' RIGHTS
ANTONIO: Shylock, although I neither lend nor borrow,
By taking nor by giving of excess,
Yet to supply the ripe wants of my friend
I'll break a custom.
The Merchant of Venice, Act I, sc. iii
The initial action in Shakespeare's play The Merchant of Venice1
could fairly be described as the formation of a third party beneficiary
contract.2 Any question as to whether Antonio's friend, the benefici-
ary, had the right to enforce the contract made between Shylock and
Antonio was of course made unimportant by subsequent events in the
well-known plot. Nonetheless, had Shakespeare chosen to deal with
the difficulties posed by a third person's assertion of such a right, the
discussion would not have been untimely, for it was but a quarter of
a century after the stage premiere of The Merchant of Venice3 that
1. "[Wjhen seeking a subject for a play Shakespeare preferred one in which the
initial action had some legal foundation." 0. PHiLUPS, SHAKEsPEARE AND THE LAWYERs
46 (1972). The initial action in The Merchant of Venice may be stated briefly as fol-
lows: Bassanio, a sixteenth century adventurer in need of money to finance a voyage,
seeks help from his friend Antonio, an elderly merchant. With the purpose of assisting
Bassanio, Antonio secures from Shylock, a userer, a sum of money. In return for the
money, Antonio promises Shylock that if the sum is not repaid by a certain date, An-
tonio will forfeit a pound of flesh.
2. Williston defines a third party beneficiary contract as "[a] contract in which
the promisor engages to the promisee to render some performance to a third person."
2 S. WLUSTON, CoNTRAcrs § 347, at 792 (3d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as WILLIs-
TON]. That the contractual action in The Merchant of Venice fits within this definition
is evidenced by Bassanio's lament:
[Flor, indeed,
I have engaged myself to a dear friend,
Engaged my friend to his mere enemy,
To feed my means.
W. SHAKEsPEARE, THE MERcHANT OF VENICE, Act HI, sc. ii. For general background
on the law of third party beneficiary contracts, see 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 302-
19 (1964); 4 A. ConrN, CoNTRACTS 09 772-855 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Conm];
2 WLLIsTON, supra, §§ 347-403; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS H9 133-47
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Tentative Draft No. 3]; Annot., 81
A.L.R. 1271 (1932).
3. The earliest recorded performance was February 10, 1605 at court before King
James L SHLmPEARE: MAJOR PLAYs AND THE SONNETS 299 (G. Harrison ed. 1948).
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the English courts first permitted a third party to enforce a contract
made by others for his benefit.4
Ever since the acceptance of the third party action in seventeenth
century England, 5 the law of third party beneficiary contracts has been
plagued by theoretical uncertainties, 6 doctrinal difficulties, 7 and confu-
sion.8 Problems created by judicial grants of relief to persons not
privies to the contract and strangers to the consideration 9 proved too
onerous for the English courts. In 1861 they repudiated the third
party beneficiary doctrine and adopted the present English rule deny-
ing any contract action based on the third party beneficiary theory. 10
In the United States the early historical path traveled by the third
4. Provender v. Wood, 124 Eng. Rep. 318 (C.P. 1630). The court in Provender
stated, "[The party to whom the benefit of a promise accrews, may bring his action."
Id. at 318.
5. See, e.g., Dutton v. Poole, 83 Eng. Rep. 523 (K.B. 1677).
6. The theoretical basis underlying the doctrine permitting recovery by a third
person on a contract made by others for his benefit has been the subject of much de-
bate and decisional conflict. Theories which courts and scholars have resorted to as
bases for affording the beneficiary a remedy have included trust, blood relationship, sub-
rogation, agency, novation, assignment, and avoidance of circuity of action or multipli-
city of suits. Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1271-72, 1283-85. "But now that the doctrine
is firmly established and its respectability is unquestionable, there is no occasion for giv-
ing it a fictitious basis or origin, or laying it, cuckoo fashion, in the nests of agency,
subrogation, trusts, etc. . . . The doctrine has become a rule of law in its own right,
and should be so treated." Id. at 1285.
7. See text accompanying notes 26-74 infra.
8. Corbin refers to the area as a "morass." 4 CoRBN, supra note 2, § 772, at
3. Williston calls the issues involved in third party beneficiary law "a source of trouble
and confusion." 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 347, at 795.
9. The concepts of privity and consideration are not the same. 4 CORBIN, supra
note 2, § 779, at 31. But see Samuels, Contracts For the Benefit of Third Parties, 8
U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 378, 381-83 (1968). Privity refers to the relationship between
those who exchange promises or those to whom a promise is directed. J. CALAMARI
& J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 243, at 378 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CA. AMARI]. Con-
sideration for a promise may come from the party to whom the promise was made, or
from a third person. 4 CoRBIN, supra note 2, § 779, at 31. Although both concepts
were used in early cases to deny remedies to third party beneficiaries, today the general
rule in the United States is that a third person may sue on a contract made for his
benefit even though he is a stranger to the contract and to the consideration therefor.
17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts §§ 302, 308 (1964).
10. Tweddle v. Atkinson, 121 Eng. Rep. 762 (Q.B. 1861). English courts have,
however, been "very ready to torture such a contract into a trust." CALAMARI, supra
note 9, § 243, at 378, quoting, 1 A. ScoTr, TRusTs § 14.4, at 152 (3d ed. 1967). The
trust theory as a basis for entertaining actions by contract beneficiaries was established
in Tomlinson v. Gill, 27 Eng. Rep. 221 (Ch. 1756). For a discussion of contract bene-
ficiary law in England see Simpson, Promises Without Consideration and Third Party
Beneficiary Contracts in American and English Law, 15 INT'L & COMP. LQ. 835, 848-
52 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Simpson]; Comment, Third Party Beneficiary Contracts
in England, 35 U. Cm. L. Rv. 544 (1968).
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party beneficiary concept was a more tortuous one.11 Nevertheless,
today every jurisdiction save one 2 recognizes the right of a third person
to enforce a contract made for his benefit. 3 Unfortunately, the demise
of privity and consideration as doctrines for denying a third party's
cause of action failed to likewise occasion the demise of doctrinal diffi-
culties. Rather, the focus of judicial concern merely shifted from the
question of whether any third party should be able to enforce a contract
made by others for his benefit, to the question of whether a particular
third party should be so entitled.
Recognition of the fact that not every sort of beneficiary deserved
the right to sue on a contract entered into by others made it necessary
for courts to find some basis for creating a reasonable dichotomy be-
tween beneficiaries with, 4  and beneficiaries without,' 5 enforceable
rights. In the search for workable decision-making criteria, both
scholars and courts perused a variety of rules, tests, and standards.' 6
Today, the search continues, and the fact that courts are still
wrestling with a variety of tests is pointedly illustrated by the most re-
cent California case concerned with the contractual rights of third party
beneficiary claimants. In that case, Martinez v. Socoma Companies,'
7
the California Supreme Court rejected a claim that plaintiffs, represen-
tatives of a class of 2,017 hard-core unemployed residents of East Los
Angeles, were third party beneficiaries of government contracts which
required defendant companies to provide training and jobs to plain-
tiffs and their class. In a four to three decision, the court held that
11. See Ashe, A Commercial Lawyer Looks at Contractual Privily: Third Party
Rights and Remedies, 76 COMM. LJ. 233, 234-35 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ashe];
Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1288-92 (1932).
12. Massachusetts is the only state which continues to deny recovery to third par-
ties on the contract beneficiary theory. Simpson, supra note 10, at 853; see Note, The
Third Party Beneficiary Rule in Massachusetts, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 130 (1973).
However, statutes and judicial construction have engrafted a number of exceptions onto
the general rule of nonrecovery. Id. at 131.
13. The right of enforcement is recognized in some jurisdictions by legislation,
while in others by judicial decision. 2 WILLIsToN, supra note 2, § 368, at 897; Ashe,
supra note 11, at 233.
14. Beneficiaries determined to have enforceable rights under a contract have been
given various names including donee, creditor, intended, and protected beneficiaries, de-
pending on the test used to determine their existence. See text accompanying notes 19-
74 infra.
15. Beneficiaries who may be benefited by the performance of a contract but who
are denied standing to sue on the contract are generally called incidental beneficiaries.
Corbin has called the term "a sort of omnium gatherum" which, being merely a negative
definition encompassing all beneficiaries found not to have enforceable rights, "is not
a particularly helpful definition." 4 CoPniN, supra note 2, § 779C, at 40-41.
16. See text accompanying notes 19-135 infra.
17. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
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any benefits accruing to plaintiffs' class were intended only as a means
of executing the public purposes stated in the government contracts and
their authorizing statutes, and that therefore plaintiffs were mere inci-
dental beneficiaries of the contracts and lacked standing to sue.
18
Because both the majority and the dissent in Martinez purported
to base their decisions on a number of third party beneficiary criteria,
a profitable consideration of the case requires some knowledge of the
various tests courts have used to determine which beneficiaries have
enforceable rights, and some familiarity with the additional decisional
factors courts have considered in dealing with government contracts
which benefit third parties. Following a detailed examination of these
tests, the focus of this note will shift to the California court's application
of such tests to the particular fact situation in Martinez. Finally, sug-
gestions will be made for fashioning more workable criteria for decid-
ing third party beneficiary cases such as Martinez.
Development of the Dichotomy:
The Search for "The Test"
The Categorization Scheme
The Restatement of Contracts was the watershed in the judicial
transformation from strict observance of the privity rule to a more uni-
versal recognition of third party beneficiary rights. 19 The crux of the
Restatement formula is its endorsement of mutually exclusive cate-
gories as the means for distinguishing protected from unprotected
beneficiaries.20  Restatement section 133(1)(a) affixes the label
"donee beneficiary" to a person who will benefit from performance of
a promise in a contract "if it appears. . . that the purpose of the prom-
isee in obtaining the promise . . . is to make a gift to the beneficiary
or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some perform-
ance .... ."I' Similarly, the benefited person is labeled a "creditor
beneficiary" by section 133(1)(b) if "performance of the promise will
satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the
beneficiary, or a right of the beneficiary against the promisee which
has been barred ... ."I' Beneficaries falling into either of the above
categories assume protected status and are given enforceable rights un-
der Restatement sections 135 and 136.23 On the other hand, "inci-
18. Id. at 397-98, 521 P.2d at 843, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
19. Ashe, supra note 11, at 236.
20. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932).
21. Id. § 133(1)(a).
22. Id. § 133(1)(b).
23. "[A] gift promise in a contract creates a duty of the promisor to the donee
beneficiary to perform the promise; and the duty can be enforced by the donee benefi-
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dental beneficiaries" are negatively defined in section 133(1)(c) as
all beneficiaries not described by the donee and creditor definitions.
2 4
Under section 14725 they are denied any enforceable rights.
Although the categorization scheme probably arose as an attempt
to clarify existing "intent-to-benefif' tests,28 one reason for the plan's
inadequacy today is that the division of beneficiaries into donee and
creditor categories poses difficult intent problems. In most donee
beneficiary cases, finding the requisite purpose or intent to make a gift
or confer a right is not particularly difficult, since the promisee's mo-
tive, purpose, and intent are usually the same: to bestow a gift or other
benefit upon the third person.27 In most creditor cases, however, find-
ing this same intent to benefit is often problematic, for although the
promisee wants the creditor to receive the benefit of the contractual
performance, the motive or purpose of the promisee is more likely that
of benefiting himself by procuring the discharge of his own debt or ob-
ligation.
28
Because of the difference in these two recurring third party bene-
ficiary situations, an academic debate has arisen as to the proper
method for analyzing each. One suggestion is that the promisee's in-
tent should be controlling in the donee beneficiary case, but irrelevant
in the creditor beneficiary case.29 The other proposal is that intent
should be interpreted as denoting something wholly different from pur-
pose or motive; the intent in both donee and creditor situations should
be simply the promisee's intent that the third party receive the benefit
ciary for his own benefit." Id. § 135(a). "[A] promise to discharge the promisee's
duty creates a duty of the promisor to the creditor beneficiary to perform the promise."
Id. § 136(1)(a).
24. Id. § 133(1)(c).
25. "An incidental beneficiary acquires by virtue of the promise no right against
the promisor or the promisee." Id. § 147.
26. Long before the promulgation of the categorization scheme courts were speak-
ing in terms of "intent to benefit." See cases cited in Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1286-
88 (1932). See generally CALAMU, supra note 9, § 244, at 380-84; Simpson, supra
note 10, at 855.
27. 4 CoRBiN, supra note 2, § 776, at 16; 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 356A,
at 837.
28. 2 WILISTON, supra note 2, § 356A, at 837; see 4-CoRniN, supra note 2, §
776, at 16-18.
29. This is the position taken by Corbin and Williston in their treatises. In speak-
ing of intent or purpose as a test Williston states, "Any attempt to reduce to a single
governing principle the case of the donee beneficiary and that of the creditor beneficiary
is not only doomed to failure but is an inevitable source of confusion." 2 WILLISTON,
supra note 2, § 356A, at 839. Corbin seems to adhere to this stance saying that the
donee and creditor cases "should be separately explained and not be alike based upon
the indefinite phrase 'intent to benefit."' 4 COBnIN, supra note 2, § 776 at 18. How-
ever. Corbin is not without some reservations on this noint. See note 47 infra.
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of the contracted performance.3 0 Under this latter approach, intent as-
sumes relevance in the creditor situation as well as the donee case.
3 1
The promisee intends to confer a benefit on the creditor, not for the
purpose of benefiting the creditor per se, but as a means to the dis-
charge of the promisee's obligation to his creditor.2
The Restatement adopted the proposal which suggests differing
analyses of the donee and creditor situations. Thus, the Restatement
requires that in the donee case "the purpose of the promisee [be] to
make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon -him a right .. . -. "
This requirement, along with the omission of any purpose or intent re-
quirement in the creditor beneficiary case,34 leaves the categorization
scheme vulnerable to judicial misinterpretation. Use of the terms
"purpose" and "gift" in the donee definition provides grounds for re-
strictive interpretations, as courts may search for the one purpose of
the contract 6 or require a showing of traditional donative intent. 6 On
the other hand, terminology such as "to confer a right" affords the
opportunity for expansive interpretations extending recovery beyond
true donees to any person in fact benefited by a promisor's perform-
ance.3 7  Furthermore, the requirement of a purpose to benefit in the
donee beneficiary case tends to foster what one commentator has called
"creeping subjectivity. ' 36  In essence, the promisee's motive becomes
30. "[IThe purpose usually moving the promisee to exact the provision in [the
creditor situation] is to relieve himself of a debt or duty, rather than to confer a benefit
upon the third person. But it does not follow that such contracts are not 'intended'
for the benefit of the creditor." Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1288 (1932).
31. "In the creditor beneficiary situation . . . [e]ven though the promisee's mo-
tive or purpose in buying the promise was not to benefit his creditor but rather himself,
yet it was clearly his expressed intent that the third person shall receive the benefit of
performance. So intention to benefit in the creditor beneficiary case means an intention
to create in the third party an enforceable right to the performance for which the prom-
isee bargained and furnished the consideration. The promisee's purpose is to secure
from the promisor a performance to the third party which will discharge his debt. It
can best be effectuated by permitting suit directly by the third party." Simpson, supra
note 10, at 854.
32. 26 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 628-29 (1938); Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1287 (1932);
see 4 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 776, at 16-17.
33. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(a) (1932) (emphasis added).
34. Simpson, supra note 10, at 856; 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 356A, at 839
n.19.
35. See text accompanying notes 71-73 infra.
36. Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Intention Standard: A Search for
Rational Contract Decision-Making, 54 VA. L. REV. 1166, 1168-69 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as The Intention Standard]; see Note, The Third Party Beneficiary Concept: A Pro-
posal, 57 COLUM. L. RaV. 406, 417-18 (1957) [hereinafter cited as The Third Party
Beneficiary Concept].
37. The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 423-25.
38. The Intention Standard, supra note 36, at 1188.
a determinative factor in cases involving family or friends, while the
court must still resort to more objective tests to deal with cases in com-
mercial settings.3 9
Confusion regarding the definitional sections of the Restate-
ment,40 and dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of the strict categoriza-
tion scheme in complex fact situations,41 were undoubtedly among the
"obsolete doctrinal difficulties"' the American Law Institute was seek-
ing to avoid when, in the Restatement Second, it abandoned the donee-
creditor terminology and switched to an intent standard broad enough
to encompass both categories. 43  Although the donee-creditor method
of analysis is still advocated in some academic circles44 and used by
a number of courts,45 it has been the subject of growing criticism46 even
39. CALAmri, supra note 9, § 244, at 382-83.
40. See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
41. Corbin states, "The classification also causes some difficulty for the reason
that contracts are often complex; there may be several beneficiaries of different kinds
in the case of a single contract, and sometimes a single beneficiary may have the aspect
of both a donee and a creditor or the aspect of neither one." 4 CORBIN, supra note
2, § 795, at 140. Williston notes that "it ris] difficult to classify a number of the cases
in one or the other of the aforementioned categories." 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 356,
at 830. Indeed, many courts and scholars have conceded the necessity for granting cer-
tain third party beneficiaries a remedy even though they cannot be forced into either
of the protected categories. See The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36,
at 421-23; Note, Contracts: The Third Party Beneficiary Theory is Available as a The-
ory of Recovery in Pollution Cases, 3 TExAs TECH. L. R.v. 385, 386 (1972). For ex-
amples of beneficiaries difficult to classify as either donees or creditors see 4 CORBIN,
supra note 2, §§ 356-56A, 364A, 379A; The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra
note 36, at 421-23 & n.87.
42. Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, Introductory Note at 3.
43. "The definition of 'intended beneficiary' . . . comprehends all those included
as 'donee' and 'creditor' beneficiaries in the original Restatement." RE.STATEMENT (SEC-
oND) OF ComNRucrs § 133, Reporter's Note at 18 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Tenative Draft No. 4]. The Restatement Second claims to avoid use of
the terms "donee" and "creditor" beneficiary because of the doctrinal difficulties associ-
ated with those terms. Id. The Restatement Second, however, fails to rid itself com-
pletely of the categorization influence. See, e.g., id. § 133, comments b & c; The In-
tention Standard, supra note 36, at 1169 n.26.
44. See, e.g., 4 CoRBm, supra note 2, §§ 774, 795; 2 WILLmsTON, supra note 2,
§§ 356-56A. Corbin attributes his adherence to the Restatement classifications to the
differences in legal relations of the two classes of beneficiaries. 4 CoRBIN, supra note
2, §§ 774, 795. Contra, The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 416-
21 (disputing the reasons advanced by Corbin on both theoretical and practical
grounds); 45 VA. L. Rav. 1226, 1227 n.8 (1959) (contending that beneficiaries differ
only with respect to their factual situations).
45. E.g., Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr.
585 (1974); Blair v. Anderson, 325 A.2d 94 (Del. 1974); Bond v. Home Furniture Co.,
516 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
46. The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 407, 415-25 (mislead-
ing; unsound); The Intention Standard, supra note 36, at 1169 (weak); 26 CALIF. L.
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among those who originally endorsed its efficacy."
The Intent Standard
Although heralded by the American Law Institute as "new, ' 48 the
intent standard is anything but novel.4  Rather, the institute's switch
to an intent test appears to have brought it into conformity with prevail-
ing judicial practice.50
Under the Restatement Second test, the terms "intended" and "in-
cidental" are used to distinguish beneficiaries with enforceable rights
from those who lack them.5' A beneficiary of a promise is an intended
beneficiary if "recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary
is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either (a)
the performance . . .will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay
money to the beneficiary or; (b) the promise [sic] manifests an in-
tention to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised perform-
ance."52 As in the Restatement, an incidental beneficiary is negatively
defined; any beneficiary who is not intended is incidental. 53
Despite the remedial functions the intent test was designed to
serve, the Restatement Second's new test has been as beset with diffi-
culties as the original Restatement's old test. For purposes of brevity
these difficulties will be called the who, what, and how problems of
any intent standard.
The who problem involves determining which party must intend
that a third party be benefited. A few courts have said that for a third
party to be an intended beneficiary, both parties to the contract must
Ra-V. 627, 629 (1938) (inadequate); Note, Contracts: The Third Party Beneficiary
Theory is Available as a Theory of Recovery in Pollution Cases, 3 TEXAs TECH. L. Rv.
385, 386 (1972) (obsolete).
47. Corbin expresses his doubts about the categorization scheme when he states,
"The distinction between donee beneficiaries and creditor beneficiaries may turn out to
be a quite unnecessary classification." 4 CORBiN, supra note 2, § 795, at 139. "Class-
ifications are necessary and are useful (if well-made); but they generally have imperfec-
tions and it is always dangerous to apply them mechanically as absolute tests of justice
and the law." Id. at 56 (Supp. 1971). Indeed, the American Law Institute itself has
admitted the inherent deficiencies of its categorization plan. Tentative Draft No. 3, su-
pra note 2, Introductory Note at 3.
48. Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 43, § 133, Reporter's Note at 18.
49. The Intention Standard, supra note 36, at 1169-70.
50. CALAMARI, supra note 9, § 244, at 380 n.13.
51. Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, Introductory Note at 3.
52. Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 43, § 133(1). Again section 135 makes
the rights of an intended beneficiary enforceable. Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note
2, § 135.
53. Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 43, § 133(2). An incidental beneficiary is
again denied any enforceable right by section 147. Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note
2, § 147.
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intend that he receive the benefit of the promised performance.5 4 Oc-
casionally, a court has held that it is the promisor rendering the prom-
ised performance who must intend to confer a benefit on the third
party."" The weight of authority today, however, is that it is the intent
of the promisee, who pays for the promise in question, which must gov-
em.
56
The law is not nearly so well settled as to what the promisee must
intend. One view is that the promisee's express intent must be to give
the third party the right to sue on the contract. This position has been
roundly criticized, 57 however, on the ground that a beneficiary's right
to sue should not be extinguished merely because the parties failed to
grant the right to sue in the contract.58  On the other hand, courts and
critics agree that if the parties expressly grant or deny to the third party
the right to sue, such contractual provision should be binding.59
In light of the fact that Restatement Second sections 135 and 147
respectively give and deny to beneficiaries the right to enforce the
promisor's duty to perform,60 the Restatement Second view seems to
be that the promisee need only intend to give the third party the benefit
of the promisor's perforfinance, rather than an express right to sue, in
order for the beneficiary to be able to enforce the contract.6 Never-
theless, the Restatement Second is less than clear on this point, and
thus fails to provide any definitive guidance.62
54. See CALAMAm, supra note 9, § 244, at 380; The Third Party Beneficiary Con-
cept, supra note 36, at 409; 45 VA. L. Rav. 1226, 1228 (1959).
55. See notes 80-81 & accompanying text infra.
56. Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 43, § 133(1) (b); CALAMAI, supra note 9,
§ 244, at 380; 4 CoRBIN, supra note 2, § 776, at 14; 2 WnLLIsToN, supra note 2, § 356A,
at 836.
57. 'There does not seem to be any basis for holding that, although a perform-
ance of the contract will necessarily and directly benefit the third person, his remedy
depends upon an intention on the part of the parties to the contract that he shall have
the right to sue thereon." Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1287 (1932).
58. "Mhe existence of legal relations is not dependent upon an intent to create
them." 4 ConIn, supra note 2, § 777, at 25. "[A] requirement of an intention that
the third party beneficiary should be granted the legal right to enforce the promise...
seems. . . unrealistic because, as a general rule, contracting parties do not contemplate
either a breach or the resultant litigation." The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra
note 36, at 411; see Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1287 (1932). Another problem with
the "right to sue" theory is that it tends to make the Restatements enabling sections,
135 and 147, mere surplusage. It also contradicts the reasoning behind section 145
which allows for recovery by a member of the public on a government contract in only
two circumstances, one of which is when the terms of the contract specifically provide
for such recovery. See notes 121-135 & accompanying text infra.
59. CALAMAIU, supra note 9, § 244, at 381; 4 CoRBiN, supra note 2, § 777, at
25 & n.39.
60. See notes 52-53 supra.
61. Simpson, supra note 10, at 855-56.
62. Compare Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 43, § 133(1) (b) with Tentative
September 19751 CONTRACT BENEFICIARIES' RIGHTS
As stated earlier,6 although the Restatement Second claims to
give a new definition to the intent test, variations of the intent-to-bene-
fit test have long been employed by most courts. These decisional
tests were the result of problems courts faced in deciding how to apply
an intent standard practically.
Two varieties of the intent test rely on the use of presumptions.
One test sets forth the rule that when a contract appears to create a
beneficial right in a third party, there is a presumption that the con-
tracting parties intended to confer a benefit on him, even though their
primary concern was their own benefit.64 On the other hand, a few
courts reverse the presumption and assume that the parties contract
only for their own benefit unless an intent to benefit a third party is
clearly proved.65
Two other decisional tests turn on the concept of directness. One
of these tests focuses on the person to whom the performance will be
rendered.66 If performance runs directly to the promisee, the con-
tract is presumed to be solely for the benefit of the parties.6 7  On the
other hand, a promisor's obligation to render a performance directly
to a third party will usually6 8 be determinative of the third party's status
as an intended beneficiary.69 The second "direct" test differentiates
between direct and remote beneficiaries. 70  Third parties who are
benefited only as a necessary result of the promisor's performance are
termed remote beneficiaries and are denied recovery. On the other
hand, those who receive a benefit which is intended to be one of the
Draft No. 3, supra note 2, § 135, comment e. Section 135, comment e confuses the
issue by reverting to a donee, creditor, and "other intended" beneficiary categorization.
Comment e implies that those beneficiaries within the "other" category must be intended
by the promisee to have the right to sue. The Restatement Second professes to avoid
categories because of the doctrinal difficulties they foster. Why it treats "other in-
tended" beneficiaries differently is not explained. See also Tentative Draft No. 4, supra
note 43, § 133, comment d.
63. See text accompanying notes 48, 49 and note 26 supra.
64. The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 408.
65. Id.
66. CALAMARI, supra note 9, § 244, at 381-82.
67. Id.; Simpson, supra note 10, at 856.
68. "A contract for the benefit of a third person usually provides that perform-
ance shall be rendered directly to the beneficiary, but this is not necessarily the case."
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, comment d (1932). See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm,
56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962). For a discussion of Hamm and other cases in which the "direct" test was
found not determinative, see CALAMARI, supra note 9, § 244, at 381-82; 1 B. WrrKiN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORIA LAw, Contracts § 505, at 433-34 (8th ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as WrrKN].
69. CALAMARI, supra note 9, § 244, at 381-82; Simpson, supra note 10, at 856.
70. 2 WrLLISTON, supra note 2, § 356A, at 841-42.
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direct and immediate consequences of the promisor's performance are
direct beneficiaries and are entitled to recovery.
Finally, of the numerous other tests based on the concept of in-
tent, the "degree of benefit" or "primary purpose" test deserves men-
tion in that it is the basis for much of the majority's reasoning in the
Martinez case to be discussed below. This test requires that bestowing
a benefit upon a third party must be the primary purpose and object
of the promisee.71 Because the primary purpose of the promisee, es-
pecially in the creditor beneficiary case, is usually to benefit himself, 2
this test has met with little critical approval.73
In summary, because of difficulties such as the who, what and how
problems mentioned above, the intent standard has failed to be the per-
fect decision-making test. 74  If one basic problem could be gleaned
from the many encountered in this area, it would have to be a semantic
one: what is the meaning of "intent"?
California's Statutory Test
The transition from rejection to recognition of the contract bene-
ficiary's right of action was accomplished in some states by judicial de-
cision, in others by legislation. 75  In 1872, California enacted Civil
Code section 1559, which reads: "A contract, made expressly for the
benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before
the parties thereto rescind it."
'7 6
Although section 1559 makes no reference to a categorization
scheme or an intent standard, California decisions have generally
adopted the donee-creditor classifications 77 and the courts have ver-
balized in terms of an intent to benefit test of recovery.78 Accordingly,
71. 4 ConniN, supra note 2, § 776, at 19-20.
72. Id.; 45 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1230 (1959).
73. See 4 CoRniN, supra note 2, § 776, at 19-23; The Third Party Beneficiary
Concept, supra note 36, at 411; 45 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1229-30 (1959).
74. For some typical criticisms of the intent standard see The Third Party Bene-
ficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 408-10; The Intention Standard, supra note 36.
75. See note 13 supra.
76. C&L. Civ. CODE § 1559 (West 1954). For general source material on Cal-
ifornia's third party beneficiary law see 14 CAL. Jur. 3d Contracts §§ 208-17 (1974);
1 WrrmN, supra note 68, §§ 499-512.
77. Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. ABC Constr. Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 747, 752, 22
Cal. Rptr. 540, 544 (1962).
78. E.g., Walters v. Calderon, 25 Cal. App. 3d 863, 102 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1972);
RJ. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 218 Cal. App. 2d 124, 32 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1963); Southern
Cal. Gas Co. v. ABC Constr. Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 747, 22 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1962);
Shutes v. Cheney, 123 Cal. App. 2d 256, 266 P.2d 902 (1954). Whether the contract
is intended for the benefit of a third person is a question of construction. Walters v.
Calderon, 25 Cal. App. 3d 863, 102 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1972); Woodhead Lumber Co. v.
E.G. Niemann Inv., Inc., 99 Cal. App. 456, 278 P. 913 (1929).
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most of the difficulties the California courts have experienced are the
same as those discussed in conjunction with the Restatement and Re-
statement Second tests.7 9  Nevertheless, a few particular aspects of
California third party beneficiary law merit brief discussion here.
For a time, California courts exhibited some uncertainty as to
whose intent, regarding a third party, should be controlling. Initially
the courts took the position that it was the promisor who must manifest
the intent to secure a benefit to a third party. ° Recently, however,
the California Supreme Court called such language "unfortunate" and
stated that so long as the promisor understands that the promisee has
an intent to benefit a third party, the promisor himself need not mani-
fest any such intent.81
Although the cases are indefinite as to what kind of intent the
promisee is required to demonstrate,82 California appears to adhere to
a view similar to that of the Restatement Second. California courts
have stated that the promisee must intend that the performance inure
to the benefit of the third party, 3 and that a finding of such intent is
important in determining the beneficiary's right to bring legal action
under the contract.
8 4
Problems regarding the application of California's tests of bene-
ficiary enforceability have centered around the interpretation of the
phrase "expressly for the benefit of the third party" in section 1559.
The term "expressly" has been construed to mean "in an express man-
ner; in direct or unmistakable terms; explicitly; definitely; directly."8 "
On the other hand, the phrase has been held not to mean "exclu-
sively,"8 6 "solely, '8 7 or "primarily" ' for the benefit of a third person.
79. See text accompanying notes 26-47, 54-74 supra.
80. Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 502, 271 P. 898, 901
(1928); Fruitvale Canning Co. v. Cotton, 115 Cal. App. 2d 622, 625, 252 P.2d 953,
955 (1953). See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 356A, at 836 n.2.
81. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
825 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); see Walters v. Calderon, 25 Cal. App.
3d 863, 871, 102 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93-94 (1972).
82. See cases cited notes 83-84 infra.
83. E.g., R.J. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 218 Cal. App. 2d 124, 32 Cal. Rptr. 545
(1963); Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. ABC Constr. Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 747, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 540 (1962); Shutes v. Cheney, 123 Cal. App. 2d 256, 266 P.2d 902 (1954).
84. Lucas v. Harnm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); R.J. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 218 Cal. App. 2d 124,
32 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1963). See note 181 infra. Of course, if it is provided in the terms
of the contract that the contract is, or is not, made expressly for the benefit of a third
party, such provision will govern. tSee 26 CAL. L. REv. 627 n.1 (1938).
85. Le Ballister v. Redwood Theatres, Inc., 1 Cal. App. 2d 447, 448, 36 P.2d 827
(1934).
86. Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 247, 73 P.2d 1163,
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Similarly, the term has been construed not to require that performance
be rendered "directly" to the beneficiary. 89 Moreover, the statutory
test has not limited recovery on the contract to those specifically named
or identified in the contractf 0  Consequently, its connotative meaning
having been destroyed by judicial interpretation,91 the term "expressly"
has now come to mean merely the negative of "incidentally."92
Government Contracts and Federal Statutes:
Purposes, Remedies, and Public Beneficiaries
Many third party beneficiary cases in which a federal statute is
involved or in which a governmental unit is a party have been ulti-
mately decided on traditional third party grounds.9 3 Nonetheless, most
courts deciding these cases have deemed it necessary or at least useful
to take into account a number of additional factors.
Among the factors considered have been purposes of the stat-
ute,94 remedies expressed or implied in the statute,9 5 benefits accruing
1170 (1937); Le Ballister v. Redwood Theatres, Inc., 1 Cal. App. 2d 447, 448, 36 P.2d
827 (1934); Miles v. Miles, 77 Cal. App. 219, 228, 246 P. 143, 146 (1926).
87. Le Ballister v. Redwood Theatres, Inc., 1 Cal. App. 2d 447, 448, 36 P.2d 827
(1934); Stanton v. Santa Ana Sugar Co., 84 Cal. App. 206, 209, 257 P. 907, 908
(1927); Montgomery v. Dorm, 25 Cal. App. 666, 674, 145 P. 148, 151 (1914).
88. Montgomery v. Dorm, 25 Cal. App. 666, 674, 145 P. 148, 151 (1914).
89. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 590, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
824 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Arata v. Bank of America, 223 Cal.
App. 2d 199, 206, 35 Cal. Rptr. 703, 707 (1963).
90. Garratt v. Baker, 5 Cal. 2d 745, 748, 56 P.2d 225, 226 (1936); Watson v.
Aced, 156 Cal. App. 2d 87, 91, 319 P.2d 83, 86 (1957); Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal.
App. 2d 279, 290, 272 P.2d 82, 89 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955); Wood-
head Lumber Co. v. E.G. Niemann Inv. Inc., 99 Cal. App. 456, 459, 278 P. 913, 914
(1929). This is in accord with general third party beneficiary law. See 14 CAL. Jun.
3d Contracts § 213 (1974); 4 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 776; WrrKIN; supra note 68, §
507; Langmaid, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons in California, 27 CALIF. L.
REv. 497, 510 (1939); Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1285 (1932).
91. The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 414 n.45.
92. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 590, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
825 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil
Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 244, 73 P.2d 1163, 1169 (1937).
93. For example, in Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113
Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974), the court held that plaintiffs were mere incidental beneficiaries
of contracts entered into pursuant to the Economic Opportunity Act since they did not
qualify as donee beneficiaries under basic third party beneficiary principles. In Bailey
v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 213 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974), the court held that plaintiffs were not intended beneficiaries of a consent decree
entered into pursuant to the Clayton Act since under fundamental contract law both
parties must intend for the third party to recover on the contract and must confer an
actionable right upon the third party in the contract.
94. See notes 99-103 & accompanying text infra.
95. See text accompanying notes 104-05, 111-12 infra.
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to the public in general, 96 and contractual assumption by the promisor
of a duty to compensate third parties.9 7  Often such factors have
proved not only helpful but determinative of the case at hand. Never-
theless, courts have selected, applied, and weighted these factors with-
out a great deal of precision or symmetry, and the cases demonstrate
no consensus as to which of the additional factors should be considered,
let alone which should be controlling. Consequently, the law in this
area has lacked both order and predictability, and "[i]n some States
the complex cases [have been] so poorly analyzed and there has been
so much direct conflict in decision that no litigant could be safely ad-
vised by his attorney without first taking his case to the court of last
resort." '
It is suggested that at least some of the resultant unpredictability
in this area is due to judicial failure to differentiate among certain types
of government contracts. It is further suggested that for purposes of
analysis, such differentiation is perhaps the only method of discerning
even the faintest outlines of some trends in this area.
Government Contracts Made Pursuant to Federal Statutes
If a government contract is made pursuant to a federal statute,
the government presumably enters into the contract in order to effec-
tuate an object of the statute, and the contract's purpose is usually iden-
tical with that of the statute.9 9 A judicial determination that the pur-
96. See text accompanying notes 121-35 infra.
97. See text accompanying notes 127, 182-85 infra.
98. 4 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 772, at 3. Although in this statement Corbin was
speaking about third party beneficiary cases in general, his observation seems particu-
larly apropos with regard to the case law in the area of government contracts.
99. A few examples may help to illustrate this point. Two purposes of the Immi-
gration Act of 1917 were to exclude from admission into the United States an alien
"likely to become a public charge," and to vest in a commissioner the "authority to enter
into contract[sl for the support and relief of such aliens as may fall into distress or
need public aid." Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 27, §§ 3, 29, 39 Stat. 874. Thus a
court held that a relative's contractual promise to the Department of Immigration that
he would execute his will in favor of two proposed immigrants, was made to satisfy
these statutory purposes. In re Wenninger's Estate, 239 Wisc. 432, 1 N.W.2d 880
(1942). A purpose of having national securities exchanges register with the Securities
Exchange Commission is to protect investors. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
78f(a)(3), (d), (f). Therefore, an agreement required as a condition of registration,
in which the New York Stock Exchange promised that it would comply with the provi-
sions of the Act, had as one of its purposes the protection of investors. Weinberger
v. New York Stock Exch., 335 F. Supp. 139, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (such agreement
gives a contractual right to investors and breach may create a cause of action.) Other
cases illustrative of this point include Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 240 F. Supp.
709 (W.D. La. 1965), alf'd 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967)
(school board assurances in return for federal grants made pursuant to 20 U.S.C. section
236); Blair v. Anderson, 325 A.2d 94 (Del. 1974) (state contract with federal govern-
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poses pronounced by Congress as enactor of a statute are the same as
the purposes espoused by the government as promisee in a contract
can be an important determination regarding a court's interpretation
of an agreement. 00
Occasionally, a statement of purposes in a federal statute evinces
a congressonal recognition that certain persons, or classes of persons,
will and should receive a benefit in order to effectuate a statutory
scheme.'10 If such persons should later bring an action on a contract
entered into pursuant to the federal statute, courts reading the govern-
ment contract in conjunction with the statutory purposes will have less
difficulty concluding that the third party claimants are intended benefi-
ciaries.' 0 2  On the other hand, if a statute makes no reference to third
persons and demonstrates no contemplation that those persons should
be benefited by the statutory scheme or any contracts made pursuant
thereto, courts will be less hesitant to find that such third persons are
but incidentally benefited.10 3
ment for safekeeping of federal prisoner pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 4042); Shell v.
Schmidt, 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955)
(government contract made pursuant to Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946, ch.
268, § 2, 60 Stat. 208). For cases involving the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933, clh. 90, §§ 1-3, 48 Stat. 195, and the "Re-employment Agreements" made pursuant
thereto see Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N.J.. Eq. 462, 168 A. 862 (1933);
Morrison v. Gentler, 152 Misc. 710, 273 N.Y.S. 952 (Mun. Ct. 1934); Canton v. Palms,
Inc., 152 Misc. 347, 273 N.Y.S. 239 (City Ct. 1934); Mesloh v. Schulte, 151 Misc. 750,
273 N.Y.S. 699 (Mun. Ct. 1934); James v. Sartin Dry Cleaning Co., 208 N.C. 412,
181 S.E. 341 (1935).
100. A contract, sketchy or ambiguous by itself, once determined to have been
made under authority of a federal statute, can then be fleshed out with the congressional
statements of purpose. Grafting statutory purpose provisions onto the contract can thus
provide the court with a fuller understanding of the goals, objects, and aims the govern-
ment is seeking to accomplish by exacting certain contractual performances. See, e.g.,
Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 290, 272 P.2d 82, 89 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 916 (1955).
101. See cases cited at note 99 supra. Each of the statutes involved in these cases
was held to evince a recognition that certain third parties should receive benefits
through its effectuation.
102. See cases cited at note 99 supra. In each of the cases cited the third party
beneficiary claimant was held entitled to sue on the contract made pursuant to the fed-
eral statute.
103. See, e.g., Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 306 F. Supp. 839 (D. Minn. 1969),
aff'd 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970) (competitors not intended beneficiaries of consent
decrees made pursuant to section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. section 18 (1970));
City & County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d 105, 22
Cal. Rptr. 216 (1962) (carriers not intended beneficiaries of assurances made pursuant
to Federal Airport Act of 1946, 49 U.S.C. sections 1101-13 (1970) ); Bailey v. Iowa
Beef Processors, Inc., 213 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974)
(employees not third party beneficiaries of agreement resulting in consent decree made
pursuant to section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. section 18 (1970).
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A complication may arise when a federal statute includes specific
remedies for the violation of its own terms.1 4  A court faced with an
action for breach of a contract made pursuant to the statute must de-
cide whether the statutory remedies should be deemed exclusive or
whether they should be viewed merely as supplements to existing com-
mon law remedies for breach of contract. In general, courts have held
that when an action is based on contract, and the contract is one made
pursuant to a statute, the statute establishes the standards against which
the promisor's conduct is to be measured, but the statutory remedies
do not deprive a plaintiff of his common law contractual remedies."°5
104. See, e.g., Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 306 F. Supp. 839 (D. Minn. 1969),
a/f'd 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970); City & County of San Francisco v. Western Air
Lines, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d 105, 22 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1962); Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal.
App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955); Fryns v. Fair
Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N.J. Eq. 462, 168 A. 862 (1933); cf. Abramovitz v. Trol-
man, 152 Misc. 768, 273 N.Y.S. 243 (Mun. Ct. 1934).
105. See, e.g., Weinberger v. New York Stock Exch., 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 916 (1955); Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N.J. Eq. 462, 168 A. 862
(1933). Where, however, a contract is not made pursuant to a federal statute, but
rather merely incorporates a term or terms of a federal statute, the purpose of the con-
tract and that of the statute will usually differ, and a court's inquiry into statutory reme-
dies will be much more thorough. Typical of this type of contract are construction con-
tracts which embody statutory wage, hour, or safety provisions solely because of statu-
tory mandate. See, e.g., Martinez v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 283 F. Supp. 514 (E.D.
Idaho 1968) (hours); Hensley v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 548 (D. Mont. 1968)
(safety); Willis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 76 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Okla.), rev'd
on other grounds, 171 F.2d 51 (10th Cir. 1948) (wages and hours). Although a pur-
pose of a statute may be to benefit certain persons, if the contract itself is not made
to effectuate the purposes of the statute, courts will not assume that the contract was
made to benefit those persons. Rather the cases demonstrate a feeling on the part of
courts that only when Congress has provided the third party with a statutory remedy
for the violation of a statutory provision, will the courts be warranted in granting a co-
extensive contractual remedy for breach of the statutory provision embodied in the con-
tract. Consequently, although courts sometimes speak about statutory purpose in such
cases, the focus of judicial inquiry is on whether the statute itself affords a third party
claimant an express or implied right to sue. See, e.g., Martinez v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 283 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Idaho 1968) (neither); Willis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 76 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Okla.), rev'd on other grounds, 171 F.2d 51 (10th Cir.
1948) (neither); Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., 297 N.Y. 217, 78 N.E.2d 480 (1948),
rev'd on other grounds, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) (implied); Fata v. S.A. Healy Co., 289
N.Y. 401, 46 N.E.2d 339 (1943) (express). Nevertheless, narrowing the focus of judi-
cial inquiry in this type of case has not resulted in uniformity of decision. Indeed, cases
involving the same statute and similar fact situations have emerged from judicial analy-
sis with diametrically opposite results. Compare Martinez v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
283 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Idaho 1968) and Willis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 76
F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Okla.), rev'd on other grounds, 171 F.2d 51 (10th Cir. 1948) with
Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., 297 N.Y. 217, 78 N.E.2d 480 (1948), rev'd on other
grounds, 336 U.S. 281 (1949). Each of these cases involved contracts embodying provi-
sions of the Eight Hour Laws, Act of Aug. 1, 1892, ch. 352, §§ 1-3, 27 Stat. 340; Act
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Two California cases are illustrative of the above concepts and are
important to an understanding of the Martinez case which will be dis-
cussed below.
Shell v. Schmidt
In Shell v. Schmidt& the Federal Housing Authority, pursuant
to the Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946,107 granted a contrac-
tor certain priorities on building materials. In return for these priori-
ties, the contractor promised to build a number of dwellings for veter-
ans in conformity with certain plans and specifications. The contractor
failed to comply with the designated plans, however, and veterans who
purchased the homes brought suit as third party beneficiaries of the
contract between the contractor and the United States. In concluding
that the veterans were intended beneficiaries with a right to damages
for the contractor's failure to build the houses as specified, the appellate
court relied heavily on the statutory purposes of the Veterans' Emer-
gency Housing Act of 1946.1'8 The court first determined that the
statute was passed for the purpose of benefiting veterans by looking
to the name of the statute and the fact that other courts had previously
recognized such a purpose.1"9 The court then used its finding of statu-
tory purpose to determine that the veterans were intended beneficiaries
of the contract. The court noted that since the statute and the regula-
tions which resulted in the contract were passed to aid and benefit
veterans, the contract must also be for their benefit.110 Finally,
the court once more looked to statutory purpose to reject the contrac-
tor's argument that the statute itself contained the veterans' exclusive
remedy." 1 In holding that the enumeration of remedies in the statute
merely created new remedies, without displacing others, the court
stated:
of June 19, 1912, ch. 174, §§ 1-2, 37 Stat. 137. For a discussion of Willis and Filardo
see 18 U. CN. L. REv. 108 (1949).
106. 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955).
107. Ch. 268, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 207. The purpose of this act was "to accelerate
the production of houses with preferences for veterans of World War Il and at sales
prices or rentals within their means." Id. § 1, at 208.
108. 126 Cal. App. 2d at 285-87, 290, 272 P.2d at 86-88, 89.
109. Id. at 286, 272 P.2d at 87.
110. Id. at 290, 272 P.2d at 89.
111. Id. at 285-86, 272 P.2d at 86. The contractor argued that the exclusive reme-
dies for violations of the contract were those specified in sections 7(a) and 7(d) of
the statute. Section 7(a) gave the government the authority to obtain monetary com-
pensation for purchasers from contractors on account of deficiencies in construction re-
sulting from the contractor's failure to comply with building specifications. Section 7
(d) gave the individual purchaser the statutory right to sue the contractor for violation
of the maximum selling price fixed by the FHA and to recover the amount by which
the price paid exceeded the fixed price. Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946,
, *A 9,9 S 7f.) rl Ml' A.f- ?7 '711
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We agree with respondents that the federal statute should not be
interpreted as containing the exclusive remedies of purchasers so as
to deprive them of their common law remedies .... This would
be in subversion of the very purpose and intent of the statute.
112
City & County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc.
In another recent California case, City & County of San Francisco
v. Western Air Lines, Inc.," 3 the court of appeal likewise relied upon
statutory purpose, but determined that the third party claimant was
merely an incidental beneficiary. That case involved receipt by the
City and County of San Francisco of federal funds for the development
of its airport under authority of the Federal Airport Act of 1946. 11
In return for the federal aid, the city made various assurances to the
federal government, one of which was that it would "operate the Air-
port for the use and benefit of the public, on fair and reasonable terms
and without unjust discrimination.""5  Western Air Lines, claiming
that it had been unjustly charged higher rates than other carriers for
its use of the airport, sued as a third party beneficiary of the city's assur-
ances given pursuant to the Federal Airport Act. One of the rea-
sons 1 6 given by the court of appeal for rejecting this contention was
that "[ain examination of the act as a whole disclose[d] that its pur-
pose [was] to promote a nationwide system of public airports . . .
and not to regulate airport operations." 117 The court then emphasized
that the various agreements and assurances which the city was required
to provide were simply promotive of the act's general purpose."
8
Furthermore, the court noted that the statute itself made no men-
tion of plaintiff or its class, and that it neither expressly nor impliedly
provided users of an airport with a private legal remedy." 9 Rather,
the court observed that the language of the granting agreement dis-
closed that it was simply a financial arrangement between two parties,
and that such language "echo[ed] the language of the statute."' 20
Government Contracts Benefiting the Public
In a case such as Western Air Lines in which a contract demon-
112. 126 Cal. App. 2d at 285, 272 P.2d at 86.
113. 204 Cal. App. 2d 105, 22 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1962).
114. Ch. 251, §§ 1-20, 60 Stat. 170.
115. 204 Cal. App. 2d at 118, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
116. Another reason for the court's decision related to the fact that the benefit of
the agreement inured to the "public." See text accompanying notes 121, 191 & 234
infra.
117. 204 Cal. App. 2d at 119-20, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25 (citation omitted).
118. Id. at 120, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
119. id. at 120-25, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 225-28.
120. Id. at 120, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (citation omitted).
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strates government intent that a particular performance should inure
to the benefit of the entire public, or a segment thereof, additional
problems may arise concerning the right of an individual member of
the public to enforce the contract.
Because every contract made by a governmental unit is to some
extent made for the benefit of those the unit governs,'12  and because
courts have feared that imposing upon a promisor an obligation to each
member of the governmental unit would result in too crushing a bur-
den,' 22 both Restatements have special provisions dealing with such
government contracts. Sections 145 of both the Restatement and the
Restatement Second set forth a general rule that promisors contracting
with governmental units will not be liable to members of the public
for breach of contract. The Restatement provides that "a promisor
bound to the United States or to a State or municipality 23 by contract
to do an act or render a service to some or all of the members of the
public,' 2 is subject to no duty under the contract to such members to
give compensation for the injurious consequences of performing or at-
tempting to perform it, or failing to do so,""25 unless the contract falls
within certain enumerated exceptions.
In line with its donee-creditor analysis of third party beneficiary
cases, the Restatement allows for two exceptions to the general rule
of non-liability in section 145. The first exception, a special applica-
tion of the donee beneficiary definition in section 133(1)(a), 2 allows
for recovery by a member of the public if "an intention is manifested
in the contract . . . that the promisor shall compensate members of
the public for such injurious consequences .... ,127 The other excep-
tion to section 145 is a similar special application of the creditor bene-
ficiary definition in section 133(1)(b),2 and allows for beneficiary
recovery if "the promisor's contract is with a municipality to render ser-
vices the non-performance of which would subject the municipality to
a duty to pay damages to those injured thereby."'1 29 The Restatement
Second follows the lead of the Restatement in its drafts of section 145
121. CALAMAEI, supra note 9, § 247, at 387.
122. See id. at 388-89 & n.63.
123. Here the Restatement Second speaks in terms of "a government or governmen-
tal agency." The Restatement is narrower in that it limits governmental promisees to
the United States, a state, or a municipality.
124. The Restatement Second refers only to "the public" whereas the Restatement
speaks in terms of "some or all of the members of the public."
125. REsTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 145 (1932).
126. Id. § 145, comment a.
127. Id. § 145(a).
128. Id. § 145, comment a.
129. Id. § 145(b).
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and the two exceptions, although it contains minor changes 3 ° and is
phrased in more general terms.'
Recognizing, however, that Restatement section 145 was in some
respects too restrictive' 32 and had often denied rights to third parties
simply because of doctrinal difficulties, 33 the Restatement Second
added a new subsection to section 145. M This new subsection pro-
vides that the general rules applicable to non-governmental third party
beneficiary contracts should likewise apply "to contracts with a govern-
ment or governmental agency except to the extent that application
would contravene the policy of the law authorizing the contract or pre-
scribing remedies for its breach."'u3 Thus, according to the Restate-
ment Second, government contracts should be treated the same as other
contracts unless the performance of the promisor would inure to the
benefit of the public, in which event the contract must fall within one
of the two exceptions to the general rule of nonrecoverability by a
member of the public, or unless such treatment would contravene the
law authorizing the contract. Nevertheless, there remains the major
and unresolved problem as to when a person within a certain group
or class should be considered a "member of the public" and thus be
required to come within a section 145 exception in order to qualify for
relief.
Martinez v. Socoma Companies:
Juggling Criteria and a Four-three Decision
The availability of such a variety of tests of third party enforce-
ability, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, has contributed
130. The exceptions in the Restatement Second provide for promisor liability if
"(a) the terms of the promise provide for such liability; or (b) the promisee is subject
to liability to the member of the public for the damages and a direct action against the
promisor is consistent with the terms of the contract and with the policy of the law
authorizing the contract and prescribing remedies for its breach." Tentative Draft No.
3, supra note 2, § 145(2) (a)-(b).
131. Id. § 145, Reporter's Note.
132. CAIAMARI, supra note 9, § 247 at 388 n.57.
133. Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, § 145, comment a.
134. Id. § 145(1).
135. Id. The new subsection was added to reflect the disappearance of doctrinal
difficulties while still allowing for the consideration of relevant factors in particular sit-
uations and "to avoid any implication that the liability of a government contractor to
beneficiaries is broader than that of other contractors." Id. § 145, Reporter's Note.
Professor Calamari feels that the new subsection provides for those cases in which in-
dividual public beneficiaries of government contracts were allowed enforceable rights al-
though not fitting strictly within either of the exceptions to section 145 of the Restate-
ment. CALAM AR, supra note 9, § 247, at 389. In addition, the new subsection recog-
nizes the judicial practice of looking to statutory purposes and remedies as relevant fac-
tors in government contract cases. See text accompanying notes 93-105 supra.
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little toward achieving overall clarity and predictability in the area of
third party beneficiary recovery. Although this variety could perhaps
be defended on the ground of providing for judicial flexibility, it seems
a more accurate observation that "the application of vague tests capable
of almost unlimited expansion to reach a supposedly desirable result
[has] contributed to uncertainty of policy and difficulty of analysis."'""
Indeed, too many cases demonstrate the propensity of courts to jump
from test to test, stressing either the language which makes the test
more inclusive or that which makes it more restrictive, depending on
what result the particular court deigns most desirable. 3 7  It is this very
brand of judicial manipulation which is so pointedly illustrated in Mar-
tinez v. Socoma Companies.
138
The Facts
In 1967 Congress amended the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964 to provide for the development of special impact programs. 39
The programs were to be directed toward the solution of chronic unem-
ployment and dependency existing in particular communities or neigh-
borhoods within urban areas having especially high concentrations of
low-income persons.
On October 2, 1967, the President of the United States issued a
directive calling on private industry to join with the federal government
in implementing the special impact programs by helping to find jobs
136. The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 406-07. Another
commentator has observed that the rule of third party beneficiary recovery "is still
somewhat confused because courts-with no firm conviction, and without consistency
of adaptation--continue to insist upon the presence of certain elements to sustain the
rights asserted by the parties to be benefited. These elements have degenerated from
things of substance to mere figments of form, yet their persistence results in an anom-
oly of contract law which has become all the more pointed because of the dynamic ex-
pansion of third party relations and of third party rights under modem social legislation
and social relations." Richardson, Third Parties and the Contract Relationship, 17
BRooKLYN L. REV. 29 (1950).
137. The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 416.
138. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
139. Act of Dec. 23, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 103, 81 Stat. 688, amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2994d (1970).
140. Id. § 150, 81 Stat. 688. The amendments authorized financial assistance for
"programs which provide financial and other incentives to business to locate in or near
the areas served so as to provide employment opportunities for residents of those areas"
for "activities which create new training and employment opportunities" and for "man-
power training programs for unemployed or low-income persons which support and com-
plement economic, business, and community development programs." Id. § 151, at 689.
To receive financial assistance, a program was, among other things, to "promote the de-
velopment of entrepreneurial and management skills and the ownership or participation
in ownership of assisted businesses by residents of the area served." Id. § 152(a)(2),
at 689.
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and provide training for thousands of the nation's hard-core unem-
ployed."" Funds for the administration of the special impact programs
were appropriated to the Department of Labor, and following the
designation of the East Los Angeles neighborhood as a special impact
area, the department made available sums for contracts with local pri-
vate industry.
142
On January 17, 1969, the secretary of labor, acting on behalf of
the Manpower Administration of the United States Department of La-
bor, entered into contracts with three corporations: Socoma Com-
panies, Lady Fair Kitchens, and Monarch Electronics International.
Each of the contracting corporations agreed to lease space in a vacant
Los Angeles jail building, to invest in the building's renovation, and
to establish a plant for the manufacture of certain articles.143  The cor-
porations further agreed to train and employ stated numbers144 of certi-
fied hard-core unemployed residents of East Los Angeles for a period
of at least one year at a statutory minimum wage rate. 145 In addition,
the contractors promised to arrange for the orderly promotion of such
employees into available supervisory, managerial, and other positions,
and to enable them to obtain an ownership interest in the employer
corporation through a stock purchase plan. As consideration, the gov-
ernment agreed to pay each corporation a stated amount in install-
ments. 146 By January, 1970 the government had paid substantial
amounts to the corporations. 147  Each corporation, however, failed to
perform under its contract.'48
On April 9, 1970, nine members of a class of 2,017 East Los
Angeles residents, who had been certified by the government as dis-
advantaged, hard-core unemployed and were therefore qualified for
employment under the contracts, brought a class action against the
three corporations. Plaintiffs sought to recover damages for the loss
141. See Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 99 Cal. Rptr. 767, 768 (Cal. App. 1972), affd
11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
142. Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 11 Cal. 3d 394, 398, 521 P.2d 841, 843, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 587 (1974).
143. Id.
144. Socoma agreed to hire 650 persons, Lady Fair 550 persons, and Monarch 400
persons. Id.
145. The starting minimum wage was to be $2.00 per hour for the first 90 days
and thereafter a minimum of $2.25 per hour, or the prevailing wage for the area if
higher. Id. at 410, 521 P.2d at 851-52, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96.
146. Socoma was to receive $950,000, Lady Fair $999,000, and Monarch $800,000.
Id. at 398, 521 P.2d at 843, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
147. Socoma had received $712,500, Lady Fair $299,700, and Monarch $240,000.
Id. at 399, 521 P.2d at 844, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
148. Socoma did provide 186 jobs but wrongfully terminated 139 of them. Lady
Fair provided 90 jobs but wrongfully terminated all of them. Id.
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of wages and job training which would have accrued to 1,600 mem-
bers149 of the class had the defendant corporations fully performed un-
der the contracts. The trial court sustained general demurrers to the
complaint on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue as third
party beneficiaries. The appellate court affirmed,' 50 holding that al-
though plaintiffs appeared to be donee beneficiaries of the contracts
within Restatement section 133(1)(a), they could not recover on the
contracts since they were also members of the public within Restate-
ment section 145. The court held that plaintiffs failed to come within
an exception to the rule in section 145 because the contracts conferred
upon them the right to receive only training and employment, not
monetary damages in lieu thereof.'
In a four to three decision the Supreme Court affirmed the dismis-
sal on demurrer.'5 2 The majority held that not only did the contracts
fail to provide that either the government or the defendants were to
be liable to members of the public such as plaintiffs, but furthermore
that plaintiffs failed even to qualify as donee beneficiaries of the gov-
ernment contracts. 53
The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Wright, writing for the majority of four, laid the
foundations for his analysis of the Martinez case by noting that the
statutory test in California Civil Code section 1559, which limits third
party actions to those on contracts made expressly for the third person's
benefit, has in effect merely prevented recovery by incidental benefici-
aries.'5 4 The Chief Justice then emphasized that California courts
have generally used the donee and creditor categories of the Restate-
ment in determining which types of contract beneficiaries may re-
cover.' 55 Thus, although Chief Justice Wright initially acknowledged
that "[ulnquestionably plaintiffs were among those whom the Gov-
ernment intended to benefit through defendants' performance of the
149. See note 144 supra.
150. Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 99 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal. App. 1972).
151. Id. at 772-73. The appellate court distinguished Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal.
App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955), on the basis that
the third party beneficiaries in Shell acted in reliance on the contract, whereas there
was no showing of any such reliance by the plaintiffs in Martinez. Id. at 770. See
4 CoRBiN, supra note 2, § 782 (Supp. 1971). But see note 217 infra. The appellate
court also demonstrated a reluctance to award damages to plaintiffs on a policy basis
saying that "such benefits, if awarded ... could be detrimental to the participants and
society as a whole." Id. at 773.
152. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
153. Id. at 397-98, 521 P.2d at 843, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
154. See text accompanying notes 85-92 supra.
155. 11 Cal. 3d at 400, 521 P.2d at 844-45, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
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contracts," 15 6 he nevertheless maintained that those intended benefici-
aries would not be allowed to recover on the contracts unless they could
be brought within one of the Restatement definitions of donee or credi-
tor beneficiary.
Plaintiffs As Donee Beneficiaries
Since plaintiffs never claimed to be creditor beneficiaries of the
government contracts, 5 ' the majority narrowed the issue to whether
plaintiffs could be classified as donee beneficiaries within the definition
of that term in Restatement section 133(l)(a). In other words, the
majority took the position that in order for plaintiffs to have standing
to sue on the contracts, it was necessary for the court to find that the
purpose of the government was to confer upon plaintiffs either a "gift"
or "a right against the promisor to some performance."'518
The majority first ruled out the possibility that the benefits to
plaintiffs were intended as gifts, stressing that the government received
good consideration for its procurement of jobs for the plaintiffs. In
support of this finding of consideration the majority cited two California
cases which involved state grants of aid to the indigent aged and to
veterans.' 59 Both cases held that such grants were for public purposes
and therefore were not violative of California's constitutional provi-
sion' 60 prohibiting the legislature from making gifts of public money to
individuals. The majority concluded that in Martinez
[t]he benefits of such [special impact] programs are provided not
simply as gifts to the recipients but as a means of accomplishing a
larger public purpose. The furtherance of the public purpose is in
the nature of consideration to the Government, displacing any gov-
ernmental intent to furnish the benefits as gifts.' 61
Essentially, then, the majority reasoned that although plaintiffs
were unquestionably intended to benefit from performance of the con-
tracts, they were not intended to benefit by receiving that which has
been traditionally defined as a gift, and therefore they did not come
within the gift definition of donee beneficiary in Restatement section
133(1) (a). Such reasoning, of course, ignored the fact that the Re-
statement itself provides a definition of gift as "some performance or
right which is not paid for by the recipient and which is apparently
156. Id. at 401, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
157. Id. at 400, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
158. Id. at 401, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
159. Id. at 401, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589, citing County of Ala-
meda v. Janssen, 16 Cal. 2d 276, 106 P.2d 11 (1940); Allied Architects' Ass'n v. Payne,
192 Cal. 431, 221 P. 209 (1923).
160. CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 31 (1879).
161. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 401, 521 P.2d 841, 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1974).
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designed to benefit him."16 2  Furthermore, by insisting that even un-
questionably intended beneficiaries must fit within a strict donee bene-
ficiary definition in order to sue on the contracts, the majority stumbled
into two of the pitfalls, mentioned earlier,163 which inhere in the cate-
gorization scheme and have led to its decline. First, not all benefici-
aries deserving of enforceable rights can be forced into strictly defined
and labeled categories. Second, the very terminology of the donee
and creditor definitions leaves them susceptible to just such overly re-
strictive interpretations.
Moreover, even if the government did not intend to confer a gift
upon the plaintiffs, Restatement section 133(1)(a) provides an alter-
native definition of donee beneficiary to cover those cases "where,.
though the promisee receives consideration from the beneficiary, there
is manifested an intent that the beneficiary shall acquire a right against
the promisor to some performance. ... "64 The most unsatisfactory
aspect of the Martinez opinion was the reasoning which allowed the
majority to conclude that plaintiffs likewise were not donee benefici-
aries within this definition.
The majority first asserted that under this definition it was neces-
sary for the right acquired by the plaintiffs to be "a direct right to bene-
fits or damages in lieu of benefits." '65  Next, without explaining why
the contractual provisions requiring defendants to provide plaintiffs
with jobs and training did not give plaintiffs a direct right to benefits, 66
the majority stated that plaintiffs were not donees within section 133
(1) (a) because the "contracts [manifested] no intent that the defend-
ants pay damages to compensate plaintiffs or other members of the
public for their nonperformance,"' 67 and thus failed to meet the re-
quirements of Restatement section 145. To meet plaintiffs' argument
that section 145 was inapplicable to the case, however, the court merely
stated that even if section 145 did not apply, plaintiffs still would not
be donee beneficiaries because the promisee did not intend "to confer




162. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, comment c (1932). The dissent notes
the applicability of this definition. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 412 n.3, 521 P.2d 841, 853, 113
Cal. Rptr. 585, 597 (1974).
163. See note 41 & text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
164. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, comment c (1932). For a California
case decided on the basis of this definition, see Gourmet Lane, Inc. v. Keller, 222 Cal.
App. 2d 701, 705, 35 Cal. Rptr. 398, 400 (1963).
165. 11 Cal. 3d at 401, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
166. The most the majority says is that "a governmental intent to confer such a
direct right cannot be inferred simply from the fact that the third persons were intended
to enjoy the benefits." Id.
167. Id. at 402, 521 P.2d at 846, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
168. Id. at 404, 521 P.2d at 848, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 592 (emphasis added).
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The majority's reasoning is obviously circular, with the court in
effect using Restatement section 145 as authority for requiring that
plaintiffs be given damages or a right to sue on the contract in order
to be donee beneficiaries within section 133 (1) (a). Moreover, this
reasoning ignores the fact that section 145 does not govern section 133,
but rather is a special application of section 133,19 to be used in cases
involving government contracts which benefit the public. Indeed, Jus-
tice Burke, writing for the dissent, convincingly refuted the majority's
use of section 145 when he discussed in his dissenting opinion the rea-
sons underlying the special rules applicable to that section:
The language of section 133, standing alone, could reasonably sug-
gest that members of the general public are "donee beneficiaries"
under any contract whose purpose is to confer a "gift" upon them.
Section 145 qualifies this broad language and treats the general
public merely as incidental, not direct, beneficiaries under contracts
made for the general public benefit, unless the contract manifests
a clear intent to compensate such members of the public in the
event of a breach. Section 145 does not, however, entirely pre-
clude application of the "donee beneficiary" concept to every gov-
ernment contract. Whenever, as in the instant case, such a con-
tract expresses an intent to benefit directly a particular person or
ascertainable class of persons, section 145 is, by its terms, inappli-
cable and the contract may be enforced by the beneficiaries pursu-
sant to the general provisions of section 133.170
Thus, the majority's assertion that even if Restatement section 145
were inapplicable plaintiffs still would not be donee beneficiaries, since
they were given no legal right to sue, ignores the difference between
section 133 and section 145 and the reasons for requiring compensation
provisions in those government contracts which benefit the general
public and thus fall within section 145.171 Furthermore, by reading
the requirements of section 145 into section 133(1)(a), the majority
in essence adopted the right to sue theory, which requires that the par-
ties to a contract expressly give the third party a right to sue rather
than merely the right to receive a beneficial performance. As was
pointed out earlier,172 however, this test has been convincingly dis-
credited by Corbin and other scholars, as well as by a number of courts.
As further justification for its holding that plaintiffs could not be
classified as donee beneficiaries under either definition of the term in
169. RESTATEMrNT OF COTRACTS § 145, comment a (1932).
170. 11 Cal. 3d at 412-13, 521 P.2d at 853, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 597. This is in ac-
cord with the position of the Restatement Second on government contracts. See text
acccompanying notes 132-35 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
172. See notes 57-58 supra. A possible justification for the majority's position
may be found in comment e to section 135 of the Restatement Second. See note 62
supra. Nevertheless, this does not explain why the plaintiffs are not donee beneficiar-
ies within section 133 (1) (a) of the original Restatement.
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Restatement section 133(1)(a), the court advanced an interesting
"means to an end" argument. The gist of this argument was that since
the purpose of the contracts and their underlying legislation was to im-
prove certain neighborhoods and the nation as a whole, the training
and jobs to be provided plaintiffs were intended not to be benefits as
such, but merely to be the means of implementing such public pur-
poses.17 3 In relying on this argument, the majority overlooked the fact
that a contract may have several purposes,'17 4 and several beneficiaries
of different types, 175 and that section 133 requires only that "all or
part" of the promisor's performance be for the purpose of making a
gift or conferring a right upon the beneficiary. Indeed, although
the majority used the "means to an end" terminology to characterize
its theory for denying plaintiffs relief, a closer look at the court's action
makes it clear that the majority's rejection of plaintiffs' claim rested on
the ground that the contracts were not made for the primary purpose
of benefiting the plaintiffs. As noted earlier, however, the primary
purpose test, which allows third party recovery on a contract only if
the promisee's primary purpose for making the contract was to benefit
the third party, has met with great criticism' 77 and has been previously
rejected in California.
7 8
Furthermore, the majority's use of a means to an end theory for
denying relief to intended third party beneficiaries contradicts the very
basis for allowing relief in creditor beneficiary situations. As one com-
mentator explains,
In the case of most creditor beneficiaries, it is the purpose and in-
tent of the promisee to procure the discharge of his obligation. The
attainment of this end involves benefit both to himself and to his
creditor. This 'benefit' he intends to bring about as an entirety
. . . including not only the ultimate end in view but also the means
used to bring it about.' 79
Although "means to an end" terminology has not often been used in
donee situations, the recognition that in most such cases the promisee's
purpose and intent are the same, i.e. to make a gift to the third party,
suggests that the means to an end theory is similarly applicable to
173. 11 Cal. 3d at 405-06, 521 P.2d at 848-49, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93.
174. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra & note 179 infra.
175. See RErsATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 133, comment a (1932). See note 41 su-
pra.
176. REsTATEmmNT OF CoNRACTS § 133 (1)(a) (1932) (emphasis added).
177. See note 73 & accompanying text supra.
178. Montgomery v. Dorn, 25 Cal. App. 666, 674, 145 P. 148, 151 (1914). See
text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
179. 4 CoRBrN, supra note 2, § 776, at 20. In the creditor case "the motive is
not to make a gift but to confer the benefit as a means to an end, namely, the discharge
of B's debt to C." 26 CALr. L. REV. 627, 629 (1938). See notes 30-32 & accompany-
ing text supra.
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donee beneficiary cases. 180  In both donee and creditor cases, it is pre-
cisely because the benefit to the third person will be a means of effec-
tuating the promisee's purposes for making the contract, that the third
party has been afforded an action on the contract in his own right. 8'
Therefore, as will be suggested later in this note, "means to an end"
terminology can be used to advantage in analyzing contract beneficiary
cases. Little will be gained, however, if the terminology serves only
as a masquerade for such disfavored tests as the primary purpose test
used by the majority in Martinez.
Plaintiffs As Members of the Public
Having concluded that plaintiffs did not qualify as donee benefici-
aries and therefore lacked standing to bring suit against defendants, the
majority attempted to bolster its conclusion by asserting that in any
event plaintiffs, as members of the public, were also subject to the ex-
clusionary provision of Restatement section 145 because no "intention
[was] manifested in the contract . . . that the promisor [was to] com-
pensate members of the public . ,,*"1s2 The majority opinion never
really explained why the plaintiffs were members of the public or came
180. In an Illinois case adopting the means to an end analysis to allow recovery
by a donee beneficiary, the officers of a hotel contracted with the underwriters of a
bond issue for the building of the hotel. The officers promised the underwriters that
the hotel company would furnish the hotel promptly and free of lien by buying certain
goods from Carson Pirie Scott, and that if the hotel company did not pay for the goods,
the officers would. Carson installed the goods promptly and lien free, but the hotel
company did not pay for them. The court held that Carson was a beneficiary of the
contract and could sue the officers for payment. Counsel for the officers argued that
the only purpose of the contract was that the installation of the goods be done promptly
and free of lien. The court agreed that this was probably the primary concern of the
underwriters, but added that it was quite reasonable for the underwriters to have re-
quired as the method of installation lien free that they be paid for by the officers if
the hotel company failed to do so. The court explained its holding by saying, "This
contract is not merely one for prompt installation of the furnishings in any manner that
would insure their installation lien free, but is for the prompt payment of the goods
'so that the installation of same promptly and free of lien is assured.' In other words,
the contract specifies the means by which the installation of the goods lien free is to
be assured. This the promisee had a right to exact." Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Par-
rett, 346 Ill. 252, 262-63, 178 N.E. 498, 503 (1931). Corbin discusses the case at
length in 4 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 776, at 22 & n.34.
181. Witkin hints at this in his analysis of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364
P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). "The main
purpose of the testator client in making the agreement with the attorney draftsman is
to benefit the persons named in his will. Since this intent can be effectuated in the
event of breach, only by giving the beneficiaries a right of action, 'we should recognize,
as a matter of policy, that they are entitled to recover as third-party beneficiaries.'"
I WITIN, supra note 68, § 505, at 434. See note 31 supra.
182. 11 Cal. 3d at 402, 521 P.2d at 846, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
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within section 145 in the first place,183 as it merely concluded that the
lack of intent to compensate plaintiffs was evidenced by the presence
in the contracts of governmental provisions for control of disputes and
for liquidated damages. 18 4  The majority then asserted that it was this
absence of a manifestation of an intent to compensate plaintiffs that
distinguished Martinez from Shell v. Schmidt and likened it to City &
County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc.
18 5
The majority distinguished Shell because of the fact that the legis-
lation underlying the contract in Shell gave the government the right
to sue contractors who had failed to comply with building specifications
in order to obtain from these contractors compensation for veterans
who had purchased deficient dwellings.' 88 It is suggested, however,
that this legislative remedy was not a basis for the decision in Shell. 87
In fact, the court in Shell stressed that the remedies in the statute could
not be held to supplant those common law third party beneficiary reme-
dies already available to the plaintiffs.' 8
Furthermore, in Shell the court found it unnecessary to look at
Restatement section 145 at all, since the contract was for the benefit
183. The majority again simply relied on its means to an end argument. The ma-
jority stated that since the purpose of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was public
in nature, therefore "the services which the contracts required the defendants to perform
were to be rendered to 'members of the public' within the meaning of [section 145]."
11 Cal. 3d at 404, 521 P.2d at 848, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 592. In 88 Huv. L. RPv. 646,
650-51 (1975), the author discusses the policy objective underlying section 145 and
notes that the section was designed by the American Law Institute to insulate govern-
ment contractors from liability for unforeseeable damages to members of the public.
The author argues that in Martinez the majority's reliance on section 145 was improper
since the plaintiffs were suing for foreseeable damages for promised performance. An-
other interesting point with regard to the majority's position is that by refusing to dis-
tinguish the hard-core unemployed residents of East Los Angeles from members of the
public in general, the court overlooked language in one of the cases it relied on to deter-
mine that plaintiffs were not gift beneficiaries. In that case, County of Alameda v.
Janssen, 16 Cal. 2d 276, 106 P.2d 11 (1940), grants of aid to the indigent aged were
held not violative of constitutional provisions since "the classification of the indigent
aged as a group is based upon a clear distinction between them and other individuals
in the state." County of Alameda v. Janssen, 16 Cal. 2d 276, 284-85, 106 P.2d 11,
16 (1940).
184. 11 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 521 P.2d at 846, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590. But see note
225 infra.
185. 11 Cal. 3d at 403, 403-04 n.4, 406-07, 521 P.2d at 847 & n.4, 849, 113 Cal.
Rptr. at 591 & n.4, 593.
186. Id. at 403, 521 P.2d at 847, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
187. The Shell court stated, "Mhe Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946 did
not 'create' the causes of action for fraud and breach of contract. Respondents here
are relying on common law causes of action that do not find their origin in that stat-
ute. . .. Urhe statute] did not create the right to sue." 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 287,
272 P.2d 82, 87-88 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955).
188. See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
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of a class consisting of purchasing veterans, and thus any member of
that intended class could enforce it.'8 9 Finally, the court in Shell ob-
served, "It is no objection to an action by the third party that the con-
tracting party (here the government) could also sue upon the contract
for the same breach."' 90
The majority's comparison of Martinez with Western Air Lines
seems similarly inapt, since in the latter case the plaintiff was suing
on contractual assurances which required nondiscrimination toward
"the public,"'' and which thus brought the contract directly within the
scope of section 145.
In summary, the majority opinion reveals the lingering semantic
and doctrinal difficulties inherent in a strict donee-creditor analysis of
third party beneficiary contracts; the inconsistencies arising from an in-
tent test requiring that a third party be granted the right to sue rather
than the right to receive a beneficial performance; the undesirability
of a standard which denies recovery to all beneficiaries except those
whose benefit is the primary purpose of the contract; and the suscepti-
bility of Restatement section 145 to unjustified use as a catch-all device
for denying rights to beneficiaries of government contracts.
An Alternative Approach:
Renovating the Intent Standard
"A sort of mystery accompanies many of our words, both legal and
otherwise; and, indeed, many are content to rest in a comfortable fog
of mysticism and to make little effort to attain a more realistic clar-
ity.' 92 Such a fog surrounds many of the terms encountered in the
area of third party beneficiary contracts. Perhaps none is so obscured
as the term intent.'9 3  A few commentators have suggested the total
rejection of any criterion incorporating the term intent, on the ground
that the term's ambiguity leaves all such criteria "fatally flawed."' 94
Others have recognized the need for increased definitional precision, 95
but have hestitated to supply it, arguing that the adoption of particu-
larized definitions could lead to undesirable restrictiveness or conflicts
189. 126 Cal. App. 2d at 290, 272 P.2d at 89.
190. Id.
191. 204 Cal. App. 2d 105, 118, 22 Cal. Rptr. 216, 224 (1962).
192. 4 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 778, at 28.
193. See id. § 776.
194. See The Intention Standard, supra note 36, at 1171; 88 HARv. L. REv. 646,
651-52 (1975) (intent test particularly unsuitable for analyzing government contracts
because of the "amalgam" of promisees).
195. See, e.g., The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 408-10.
"[T]he imprecision of the intent to benefit approach prohibits clear analysis and pre-
dictability." Id. at 409.
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with relevant policy considerations. 96 It is suggested, however, that
to allow the continuation of existing uncertainty and confusion and to
permit the type of judicial manipulation exemplified in the Martinez
case is far more undesirable than to attempt a clarification of relevant
criteria in order to provide needed decisional guidelines.
A Proposal
Perhaps the biggest problem with the intent standard is its failure
to differentiate between the concepts of motive, purpose, and intent.
197
It is suggested that much clarity could be added to the area of third
party beneficiary law by simply recognizing that motive is the "moving
power which impels to action for a definite result;"'19 8 purpose is that
"intended or desired result;"' 99 and intent is the "[determination] to
use a particular means to effect such result."200
It is submitted that under a proper intent test the concept of mo-
tive should be ignored.20' The reasons which lead the mind to desire
or act for a certain result are usually beyond a court's determination,
and are often unknown to the actor himself.m°2 Therefore, a court's
inquiry should focus first on determining the promisee's purposes as
expressed in the contract. In other words, the court should seek to
determine the ends, aims, objects, or results sought by the promisee
through his exacting of a particular performance from the promisor.
Second, a court should ask whether it appears from the contract that
the promisee "intends" that the third party should receive the benefit
of the promisor's performance. In particular, the question should be
whether the fact that a third person will benefit from the promisor's
performance is the promisee's chosen means of effectuating a purpose
of the contract.203
196. The Intention Standard, supra note 36, at 1171.
197. Corbin begins his analysis of the intent concept with the observation that "the
ideas that lie behind such terms as 'purpose,' 'motive,' and 'intention' are obscure and
elusive. . .". 4 CoRBiN, supra note 2, § 776, at 14-15.
198. BLAcK's LAW DICTiONARY 1164 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
199. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1074 (coll. ed.
1969).
200. Br.Aca's LAw DICTIONARY 1164 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
201. "Mhe motive, purpose, or desire of the parties is a quite different thing from
their intention. The former is immaterial ... ." Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1287
(1932). See also The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 425.
202. See 4 CoRnN, supra note 2, § 776, at 15.
203. This approach is not novel. One commentator has noted that "[blecause the
parties' only real intent usually is to benefit themselves . . . a more realistic solution
than the nebulous 'intent to benefit' test seems to lie in determining first, the basic pur-
poses of the contract, and second, whether recovery by the beneficiary would accom-
plish or tend to accomplish those purposes." 31 TEXAS L. Rav. 210, 211 (1952); see
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Although this two-step approach does not solve all the problems
of third party beneficiary contracts," 4 it does help to eliminate some
of the more prevalent difficulties examined earlier in this note.2"" As
to the three main areas of difficulty inherent in an intent standard, it
is important to note that the above proposal looks to the purposes and
intent of the promisee, not the promisor2 08 The showing required un-
der the above approach is only that the beneficiary is intended to re-
ceive a beneficial performance, not that he is given the legal right to
sue. '07 Furthermore, the proposed means to an end analysis requires
neither that the benefit be direct, nor that it be the primary purpose
of the contract, or even a purpose at all.208 Since the benefit need
not be a purpose of the contract, a distinction between donee and credi-
tor categories of beneficiaries becomes unnecessary: the intent con-
cept, when defined as the determination to benefit the third party in
order to effectuate the purposes of the contract and when distinguished
from purpose or motive, is broad enough to encompass both cate-
gories. 209 Finally, the proposed test continues to deny recovery in
cases in which the third party may incidentally receive a benefit from
performance of a contract, but the benefit itself is not a means of ac-
complishing the promisee's purposes.210
The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36, at 410. For support of the means
to an end approach for analyzing contract beneficiary cases see notes 179-81 supra.
204. See The Third Party Beneficiary Concept, supra note 36 at 410, emphasizing
that despite the advantages of an objective approach, "a finding that the terms of the
contract were ambiguous would provide a possible escape, through the process of con-
struction, to the realm of 'purpose,' surrounding circumstances, and other extrinsic evi-
dence."
205. See text accompanying notes 26-28, 33-39, 54-73 supra.
206. See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
207. Once the beneficiary is determined to be "intended," the right to enforce the
promisor's duty should then attach automatically. See Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note
2, §§ 135, 147. Of course, if the contract expressly provides that the third party shall
or shall not have the legal right to sue, such provision would be controlling. See note
84 and text accompanying note 59 supra.
208. Williston makes it clear that the purpose of the contract need not be to bene-
fit the third party: "[A] contract for the benefit of a third person [is] with little re-
gard to whether the purpose of the promisee in entering into the contract was his own
benefit or the benefit of the person to whom performance was to be rendered." 2 WIL-
LISTON, supra note 2, § 347, at 792-93; see 45 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1229-30 (1959); An-
not., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1287 (1932).
209. The Restatement Second attempted to abolish the donee and creditor cate-
gories. See note 43 supra.
210. A few examples may help to illustrate the working of the proposal. In a typi-
cal donee beneficiary case the promisee's purpose for making the contract is to benefit
the third party. In order to achieve this purpose the promisee contracts to have a gift,
service, or other beneficial performance go to the third party. Giving the specific bene-
fit to the third party is the means the promisee has chosen to effectuate his purpose
of benefiting the third party. In the typical creditor situation the promisee's purpose
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 27
The area of government contracts remains a particularly prob-
lematic one. It is nevertheless suggested that a more particularized
intent test, such as the one proposed, can also help to eliminate difficul-
ties arising solely because the promisee in a contract is a governmental
unit, or because the contract in some way involves a statute. It is
therefore submitted that government contracts should be analyzed
along the same lines as private contracts,211 subject only to the follow-
ing few exceptions. First, if a contract is made pursuant to a statutory
scheme, the purposes of the contract should be determined by reading
the statute and the contract together.2 12 When such a reading discloses
an intent that a third party receive a benefit as the means of effec-
tuating the statutory and contractual purposes, the third party's contrac-
tual remedies should not be abridged or denied simply because of the
inclusion or noninclusion of specific remedies within the statutory
scheme.
In addition, because every government contract is to some degree
made for the benefit of the public or some segment thereof, a promisor
should be held liable to members of the public only if such members
qualify as intended beneficiaries under the two-step approach outlined
above and come within either of the Restatement Second's section 145
exceptions.213 The first requirement, that the member of the public
be an intended beneficiary, should often be determinative of public
beneficiary cases, since benefiting the public will often be a purpose
or end sought by the government promisee, but not also the means of
effectuating such purpose.
Finally, courts too often assume that any beneficiary of a govern-
ment contract is a member of the public and so is subject to the special
is the discharge of his own debt. The means of accomplishing such purpose is the giv-
ing of a benefit to his creditor. See also note 179 supra and the text accompanying
notes 32, 179 supra. In government contracts other factors such as statutory purposes,
statutory remedies, and public beneficiaries, must be taken into account. It is important
to note, however, that not all beneficiaries who benefit from the effectuation of a con-
tractual purpose are to be considered "intended" beneficiaries. Only where the benefit
received by the plaintiff is the means of accomplishing the ends sought will the benefici-
ary be allowed to recover. Thus in Martinez that the plaintiffs were to benefit (i.e.
were to become trained and employed individuals) was to be the means of accomplish-
ing the government's goals of neighborhood and national improvement.
211. This approach is basically consistent with that of Tentative Draft No. 3, supra
note 2, § 145(1). See text accompanying notes 134-35 supra.
212. Where a contract incorporates a statutory term, but is not made pursuant to
a statute, the general two-step approach should apply. Where a beneficiary is deter-
mined to be only incidentally benefited by the contract, however, he should be permitted
recovery for the promisors breach of a statutory provision included in the contract by
mandate of law, only to the extent that such recovery is expressly or impliedly granted
by the statute. See note 105 supra.
213. See note 130 supra.
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provisions of section 145.214 Therefore, in determining whether or not
a particular person or class of persons falls under the rubric "member
of the public", a court should consider 1) the specificity with which
the person or group is designated,2 15 2) whether or not performance
will go directly to the beneficiary, 216 and 3) whether or not such bene-
ficiary's reliance would be reasonable.
217
Application of the Proposal and the Dissenting Opinion
Although the dissent in Martinez generally spoke in terms of the
same tests as the majority, the reasoning in the dissenting opinion com-
ports more closely with the mode of analysis set out in the above pro-
posal.
Because the contracts in Martinez were made to execute a statu-
tory scheme, the dissent based its determination of the promisee's pur-
214. This is a primary argument in the dissenting opinion in Martinez. 11 Cal.
3d at 412-13, 521 P.2d at 853, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 597. See text accompanying note 170
supra.
215. See text accompanying notes 229-234 infra.
216. The Martinez dissent does make note of the fact that "one of the usual char-
acteristics of a third party beneficiary contract is that performance is to be rendered
directly to the beneficiary." 11 Cal. 3d at 410, 521 P.2d at 852, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
See note 68 supra. Although the dissent looks to the direct nature of the benefits to
determine that plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries, this inquiry could serve as well to
distinguish plaintiffs from mere incidentally benefited "members of the public."
217. The Restatement Second makes reliance an important consideration in deter-
mining whether beneficiaries, other than strict "gift" or "creditor" beneficiaries are "in-
tended" beneficiaries. The Restatement Second states that "if the beneficiary would be
reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right on
him, he is an intended beneficiary." Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 43, § 133, com-
ment d. Although this test concerns the initial determination of whether a beneficiary
should be afforded enforceable rights, the test seems even more appropriate for distin-
guishing between "public" beneficiaries who fall within section 145, and "non-public"
beneficiaries who do not. It must be noted that actual reliance is not required. The
key word is would. If the beneficiary would be reasonable in relying, he is most likely
not an unprotected member of the public. This distinction becomes more apparent
when applied to the Martinez case. Assuming that the contracts in that case were for
the purposes of benefiting both the nation and the plaintiffs, the question arises as to
who, if anyone, should be able to sue under the contracts. If a person living somewhere
in the United States should decide to sue for damages for non-performance of the con-
tracts, because the East Los Angeles neighborhood and the nation as a whole had not
been improved (as was the purpose of the contracts), it would be difficult to find that
this person's reliance on the contracts would be reasonable. A citizen of the nation
would thus fall within the category of "member of the public" and would be denied the
right to damages on the contract under section 145. On the other hand, the 1,600 certi-
fied hard-core unemployed residents of East Los Angeles who were to receive training,
wages, promotions, and ownership interests would hardly be unreasonable in relying on
the contracts. It would not be unreasonable for one of the 1,600 to decline another
job opportunity for the time he expected to be employed and trained by the defendants.
See also The Intention Standard, supra note 36, at 1190-91.
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poses for making the contracts on statements of congressional purpose
in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,218 purposes indicated in the
subsequent amendments creating the special impact programs,2 19 and
stated governmental purposes for executing the contracts with defend-
ants pursuant to the act. 220  Having read and compared these statu-
tory and contractual declarations of purpose, the dissent concluded that
the "benefits to members of plaintiffs' class were not merely the 'means
of executing the public purposes'. . . but were the ends in themselves
and one of the public purposes to which the legislation and subsequent
contracts were addressed. 221
Thus, the thrust of the dissent's argument was that the congres-
sional purpose was to benefit both the neighborhoods in which the spe-
cial programs were established and the individual unemployed persons
in those neighborhoods.222 Although this interpretation seems the
more reasonable reading of the statutory and contractual statements of
purpose, it must be noted that under the test proposed in this note,
plaintiffs and their class would be intended beneficiaries according to
the reasoning of both the dissent and the majority. Even if the only
purpose of the legislation and the pursuant contracts was to improve
particular neighborhoods and the nation as a whole, the government
intended that training and jobs be bestowed upon plaintiffs and their
class as the means for effectuating that purpose.223
If benefits received by third persons are intended by a promisee
as the means of effectuating one or more purposes of both a contract
and its authorizing statute, any remedies given to the promisee or the
218. 11 Cal. 3d at 409 n.1, 521 P.2d at 851 n.1, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 595 n.1.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 409-10, 521 P.2d at 851, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 595 (quoting portions of
the contracts' preambles).
221. Id. at 409, 521 P.2d at 851, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
222. Id. Another possibility, not followed up by either the majority or the dissent,
would have been specific inquiry into the intent of the promisee, the Secretary of Labor,
acting on behalf of the Manpower Administration of the United States Department of
Labor. Such an inquiry was the basis of a decision in a Texas case involving laborers
suing on contractual provisions for wage rates in a contract between a construction com-
pany and the government. The court concluded that "such provisions were included for
the benefit and protection of the laborers employed in constructing the building. This
construction is further fortified by the fact that the United States Department of Labor
was a party to the agreement. 'The purpose of the Department of Labor shall be to
foster, promote and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United States, to
improve their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable em-
ployment.'" Hearn v. Ralph Sollitt & Sons Constr. Co., 93 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936) quoting Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 141, § 1, 37 Stat. 736 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 551 (1970)). But see 88 HARv. L. REv. 646, 651-52 (1975). See note 194
supra.
223. 11 Cal. 3d at 401, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
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third party in the statute should not be deemed exclusive.22 4  Thus,
as the dissent in Martinez argued, the facts that the government as
promisee could have brought an action for the same breach and that
each contract included a liquidated damages clause running in favor
of the government should not have defeated plaintiffs' right to re-
covery, since "[n]othing in the contracts [limited] the right of the gov-
ernment or, more importantly, plaintiffs' class, to seek additional re-
lief. ' '2 25 This reasoning is consistent with Shell 226 and analogous cases
in other jurisdictions. 27
Having determined that plaintiffs and their class were intended
beneficiaries under general third party beneficiary principles, the dis-
senters turned their attention to the question of whether plaintiffs were
classifiable as members of the public and would therefore be denied
relief under Restatement section 145 unless they were afforded com-
pensation by the terms of the contract.2 8 In arriving at the conclusion
that the beneficiaries in Martinez were distinguishable from those pub-
lic beneficiaries to which section 145 applies,22 9 the dissent looked pri-
marily to the particularity with which the plaintiffs' class was de-
fined.28 0 The dissent noted that the beneficiaries in Martinez were to
receive the promised performance because of their membership in a
specifically defined and limited class and not simply because they were
members of the general public. 131 In making the contracts, the dissent
reasoned, the government required that the defendants agree
to provide training and jobs to a specified class of persons, whom
plaintiffs represent[ed]. The government's express intent, there-
fore, was to confer a benefit, namely training and jobs, upon an
ascertainable identifiable class and not simply the general public
itself. 232
224. See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
225. 11 Cal. 3d at 41.4, 521 P.2d at 855, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 599. "When a contract
describes a remedy for breach without an express or implied limitation making that rem-
edy exclusive, the injured party may seek any other remedy provided by law." McDon-
ald v. Stockton Metropolitan Transit Dist., 36 Cal. App. 3d 436, 442, 111 Cal. Rptr.
637, 642 (1973).
226. According to Shell the fact that the government is a party to a contract and
can sue for its breach does not affect the third party beneficiary's right to enforce the
contract. 126 Cal. App. 2d at 290-91, 272 P.2d at 89. See text accompanying note
190 supra.
227. See cases cited at note 99 supra.
228. See text accompanying notes 121-31 supra.
229. 11 Cal. 3d at 411-12, 521 P.2d at 853, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
230. Id. at 409 n.2, 411-14 & n.5, 521 P.2d at 851 n.2, 853-54 & n.5, 113 Cal.
Rptr. ht 595 n.2, 597-98 & n.5. The dissent also noted that performance was to be ren-
dered directly to the plaintiffs. See note 216 supra.
231. 11 Cal. 3d at 412, 521 P.2d at 853, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
232. Id. at 409 n.2, 521 P.2d at 851 n.2, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 595 n.2.
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Thus, the dissent concluded, one purpose of the government contracts
was that plaintiffs benefit therefrom. Moreover, since plaintiffs' class
was sufficiently defined and ascertainable the special provisions of
Restatement section 145 were inapplicable. The dissent stressed that
this conclusion was consistent with the holding in Shell, in which spe-
cific benefits went to a particular class consisting of "purchasing vet-
erans,' 233 and with the holding in Western Air Lines in which the
contract required nondiscriminatory operation of airports for the use
and benefit of "the public.
'2 4
Summary
The lower court in Martinez entered judgments of dismissal after
defendants' general demurrers to the complaint were sustained without
leave to amend. By affirming the judgments of dismissal, the majority
of the supreme court in effect held that plaintiffs could not recover un-
der any reasonable interpretation of the contracts which was pleaded
in the complaint or under any which could be pleaded by amend-
ment.23 5  In light of the majority's strained interpretation of several
basic principles of third party beneficiary enforceability, such a holding
is questionable at least. By applying a test designed to increase pre-
dictability and uniformity while still allowing for flexibility, a court
would be more likely to conclude that plaintiffs had standing to sue
on the contracts, since the government clearly intended that plaintiffs'
class should receive definite benefits as a means of executing the public
purposes of the contracts and their authorizing statutes. Moreover,
even a more straightforward analysis of the case according to the Re-
statement's categorization scheme would seem to lead a court to con-
clude, as did the dissent, that
an interpretation to which the contracts in the instant case "are rea-
sonably susceptible and which is pleaded in the complaint or could
be pleaded by proper amendment" . . . is that they were made ex-
pressly for the benefit of a particular class of persons, namely the
class consisting of the certified hard-core unemployed of East Los
Angeles. 236
Conclusion
Since the time of Shakespeare, the development of third party
beneficiary law has been inhibited by theoretical, doctrinal, and prac-
tical hindrances. In the case of Martinez v. Socoma Companies the
California Supreme Court did little to clarify or resolve the myriad dif-
233. See note 189 & accompanying text supra.
234. See notes 115, 191 & accompanying text supra.
235. See 11 Cal. 3d at 399-400, 521 P.2d at 844, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
236. Id. at 414, 521 P.2d at 854, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
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ficulties which continue to plague the judiciary in its encounters with
third party beneficiary contracts. In arriving at its holding that plain-
tiffs and their class were mere incidental beneficiaries of the govern-
ment contracts providing for their employment and training, the ma-
jority of the court engaged in the manipulation of general principles
of third party beneficiary law and special criteria applicable to govern-
ment contract cases.
California's present adherence to an outmoded scheme of bene-
ficiary categorization and a restrictively interpreted intent standard of
recovery, is in marked contrast to its overall posture in the days when
the California Supreme Court led the nation in enunciating modern
principles of contract law. The time is ripe for California to take the
initiative again in shaping and promulgating new and effective deci-
sion-making criteria in the field of third party beneficiary contracts.
No small area of contract law is more deserving of innovation.
Kay S. Bruce*
* Member, Third Year Class
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